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INTRODUCTION
Name-calling is hurtful. But when the Obama Administration
labeled Anwar al-Awlaki as a "global terrorist," it was a death
sentence. According to various media reports, the Obama
Administration has authorized the C.I.A. to use lethal force against
al-Awlaki, a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen. A U.S. drone attack
targeted but missed al-Awlaki in May 201 1.3 Approximately four
months later, armed drones operated by the C.I.A. fired a barrage
of Hellfire missiles at a car carrying him and at least one other
person.4 Al-Awlaki and another American citizen, Samir Khan,
were killed.
Copyright 2011, by PHILIP DoRE.
1. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2010) ("[T]he
United States has neither confirmed nor denied whether ... it has ... authorized
the use of lethal force against [al-Aulaqi] . . . ."); id. at 8 ("On July 16, 2010, the
U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control . . . designated
Anwar Al-Aulaqi as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist .... .").
2. See, e.g., Peter Finn, Secret U.S. Memo Sanctioned Killing of Aulaqi,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/aulaqi-killing-reignites-debate-on-limits-of-executive
-power/2011/09/30/glQAxlbUAL story.html; Vicki Divoll, Editorial, Will We
Kill One of Our Own?, L. A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010, at A25; Aamer Madhani, What
Makes Cleric al-Awlaki so Dangerous; Terrorist Wears Mask of Scholar, Knows
His Foe, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.usatoday.
com/printedition/news/20100825/la awlaki25_cv.art.htm; Charlie Savage,
Secrets Cited in White House Effort to Block Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, at
A7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/world/25awlaki.html.
3. Erika Solomon & Mohammed Ghobari, CIA Drone Kills US.-Born al
Qaeda Cleric in Yemen, REUTERS, Sept. 30, 2011, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/09/30/us-yemen-awlaki idUSTRE78TOW320110930;
Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, & Robert F. Worth, Two-Year Manhunt Led to
Killing of Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-
yemen.html.
4. See Solomon & Ghobari, supra note 3; Mazzetti, Schmitt, & Worth,
supra note 3; Paul Harris & Jamie Doward, How US. Tracked Anwar al-Awlaki
to his Death in Yemen, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 1, 2001, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/201 1/oct/01/yemen-drone-killing-ibrahim-al-asiriri.
5. Mazzetti, Schmitt, & Worth, supra note 3; Mark Schone & Matthew
Cole, American Jihadi Samir Khan Killed With Awlaki, ABC NEWS, Sept. 30,
2011, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/american-jihadi-samir-khan-
killed-awlaki/story?id=14640013. Samir Khan, an America citizen of Pakistani
origin, was an editor of al-Qaeda's English-language online magazine. Mazzetti,
Schmitt, & Worth, supra note 3. U.S. officials said that the drone strike may
also have killed Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, a Saudi bomb maker responsible for
the weapon carried by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who attempted to detonate
explosives on an American jetliner en route to Detroit. See Mazzetti, Schmitt, &
Worth, supra note 3; infra note 22.
COMMENT
This Comment argues that the C.I.A.'s targeted killing of al-
Awlaki is prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 1119,6 commonly known as
the foreign-murder statute. Although the Obama Administration
might seek to avoid this prohibition by relying on the laws of war,
this Comment concludes that any such reliance is misplaced for two
reasons: (1) the particular laws of war on which the Administration
must rely are non-self-executing,7 and (2) those laws have not been
incorporated in domestic legislation.8  Consequently, the
Administration must rely on the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) to justify violating the foreign-murder statute.9 The
AUMF does not, however, provide the needed justification.' 0
Part I of this Comment explores the background of the
President's authorization to target al-Awlaki and the federal and
international law relevant to that decision." It concludes with a
discussion of Al-Bihani v. Obama, the judiciary's latest ruling
regarding the relationship between international and domestic
law. 12 Part II begins with a discussion of the status of treaties in the
United States before and after Medellin v. Texas, a pivotal
Supreme Court decision.'3 The domestic status of relevant
provisions of the laws of war is then considered in light of
Medellin.14 Part II next discusses whether those laws of war have
been incorporated through a federal statute, specifically, the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or the AUMF. This
section is followed by a discussion of whether the AUMF
supersedes the foreign-murder statute.' The Comment concludes
that the foreign-murder statute prohibits the targeted killing of al-
Awlaki.
6. 18U.S.C.§ 1119(2006).
7. See discussion infra Part II.A.
8. See discussion infra Part II.B.
9. One argument that could be made is that the foreign-murder statute is
unconstitutional, because it infringes upon the Commander-in-Chief's wartime
powers. Whether the President can ignore certain domestic law during wartime
is not addressed in this Comment. This issue has been discussed extensively
elsewhere. See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the
Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006); Harold Hongju Koh, Can
the President be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145 (2005); Neil Kinkopf, The
Statutory Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169 (2005).
10. See discussion infra Part II.C.
11. See discussion infra Part I.A-B.
12. See discussion infra Part I.C.
13. See discussion infra Part II.A.1-2.
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
15. See discussion infra Part II.B.
16. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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I. GREEN LIGHT: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO
KILL AL-AWLAKI
A. Framing the Issue
This section begins with an account of al-Awlaki's alleged
terrorist activities.17 It then briefly discusses legal arguments that
will likely be made with respect to the Obama Administration's
decision to kill al-Awlaki.18 The foreign-murder statute is critical
to this debate because it likely prohibits the targeted killing at
issue.19 The Obama Administration, however, may be able to avoid
this prohibition by demonstrating that the laws of war prevail over
the statute.
1. Al-Awlaki-The Facts
The FBI has monitored al-Awlaki's activities for years.2 o
However, the New Mexico native did not become a priority until
authorities discovered a series of emails between him and Nidal
Hassan, the Muslim U.S. Army officer accused of killing 13
people at Fort Hood in November 2009.21 The Government has
since alleged that al-Awlaki is connected with several terrorist
plots, including the 2009 failed Christmas Day bombing in which
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives on
an American jetliner en route to Detroit.22 Al-Awlaki is also
believed to play an active role in recruiting for al-Qaeda by
uploading hundreds of inflammatory sermons to the Internet,
including a recently posted video encouraging the killing of
17. See discussion infra Part I.A. 1.
18. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
19. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
20. Madhani, supra note 2.
21. Id.
22. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2010); Gordon
Lubold, Anwar al-Awlaki: Is it Legal to Kill an American in War on Terror?,
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 7, 2010, available at http://www.
csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/0407/Anwar-al-Awlaki-Is-it-legal-to-kill-an-
American-in-war-on-terror. American intelligence officials also believe that al-
Awlaki may be connected to the recent attempt to conceal powerful bombs
inside parcels destined for Chicago. However, officials caution that that it is too
soon to draw any firm conclusions about al-Awlaki's involvement. Mark
Mazzetti & Robert F. Worth, Parcels Bound for the U.S. Carried Complex
Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/10/31/world/31terror.html?n=Top%2fReference%2f1Times%20Topics%2f
Subjects%2fT%2fferrorism.
23. Madhani, supra note 2.
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Americans.24 The Obama Administration further alleges that al-
Awlaki is "the leader of external operations" for "al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula," 25 a Yemeni terrorist group that is purportedly
part of al-Qaeda "or . .. an associated force, or cobelligerent, of al-
Qaeda." 26
Al-Awlaki's father enlisted the help of two prominent civil
rights organizations to stop the Obama Administration from
targeting his son. 27 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
and the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) recently appeared
in federal court seeking to enjoin the Administration from targeting
al-Awlaki until the lawsuit is heard.28
There was considerable debate within the Obama
Administration as to how aggressively it should respond to the
lawsuit.29 Expounding legal justifications for killing a U.S. citizen
carried significant political and legal risks.3 0 Moreover, directly
responding to the ACLU's and the CCR's claims would implicitly
confirm that al-Awlaki had, in fact, been targeted." Under these
circumstances, the Obama Administration chose to file a motion to
dismiss on grounds that did not address the merits of the case.32 A
24. Yemin Muslim Cleric al-Awlaki in US Death Threat Video, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-1 1709999.
25. Mazzetti, Schmitt, & Worth, supra note 3.
26. Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1, Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No.10-1469). See also Al-Aulaqi, 727
F. Supp. 2d at 8.
27. Charlie Savage, U.S. Debates Response to Targeted Killing Lawsuit,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at Al0, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
09/16/world/16awlaki.html.
28. Scott Shane, Right Groups Sue U.S. on Effort to Kill Cleric, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2010, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/31/
us/3 1 suit.html.
29. See Savage, supra note 27.
30. Id.
31. In its brief opposing the plaintiffs petition for a preliminary injunction,
the Administration was loathe to admit that al-Awlaki is being targeted:
Plaintiff also lacks Article III standing in this action because the relief
he seeks is based on unfounded speculation that the Executive Branch
is acting or planning to act in a manner inconsistent with the terms of
the requested injunction. . . . [S]uch allegations are entirely speculative
and hypothetical ....
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-1469) (emphasis added).
32. The Obama Administration made the following procedural arguments:
Plaintiffs complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), [must be dismissed] on the grounds that Plaintiff lacks
standing and that his claims require the Court to decide non-justiciable
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federal judge recently agreed with the Government's justiciability
arguments and granted the motion to dismiss, conceding that the
"serious issues regarding the merits of the alleged authorization of
the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen overseas must await another
day or another (non-judicial) forum."33
2. The Doctrinal Dilemma Posed by Targeting al-Awlaki
Reports of the Obama Administration's targeted killing of al-
Awlaki have sparked a firestorm of debate among human rights
advocates, constitutional scholars, and politicians.34 The most
popular objection focuses on the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against the deprivation of life without due process: As a U.S.
citizen, al-Awlaki is entitled to a judicial hearing and an
opportunity to defend himself.35 This constitutional guarantee
prohibits the Administration's pursuit of an extrajudicial killing.36
Conversely, it may be argued that the targeted killing is justified
under the President's Commander-in-Chief powers, which may
allow the President to contravene constitutional principles during
wartime. Still, others may justify the targeted killing of a U.S.
citizen based on the twin doctrines of necessity and self-defense.38
political questions. Alternatively, the Court should exercise its
equitable discretion not to grant the relief sought. In addition, Plaintiff
has no cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute.
Id. at first page (unnumbered).
33. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 6-9.
34. See, e.g., Gleen Greenwald, So Much Evidence, There's no Need to Show
it, SALON.COM (Oct. 2, 2011, 9:30 P.M.), http://politics.salon.com/2011/10/03/
awlaki 7/singleton/; Suzanne Ito, ACLU Lens: American Citizen Anwar Al-
Aulaqi Killed Without Judicial Process, ACLU.ORG (Sept. 30, 2011, 11:43
A.M.), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/aclu-lens-american-citizen-
anwar-al-aulaqi-killed-without-judicial-process; William Saletan, Drones Are
Death Warrants, SLATE.COM (Oct. 3, 2011, 9:06 A.M.), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news andjPolitics/humannature/201 1/10/anwar alawlakiand drone
strikes on uIs citizensdueyrocess wo.html; Roger Simon, Can Obama
Legally Kill You?, POLITICO.CoM (Oct. 4, 2011, 3:45 A.M.), http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/1 01 1/65046.html; Dan Hirschhorn, Obama
Impeachment a Possibility, says Ron Paul, POLITICO.COM (Oct. 3, 2011, 2:52
P.M.), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/65035.html.
35. Glenn Greenwald, On the Claimed "War Exception" to the Constitution,
SALON.COM (Feb. 4, 2010, 4:05 A.M.), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/
glenn greenwald/2010/02/04/assassinations.
36. Id.
37. See generally Kinkopf, supra note 9. This argument is similar to the
Bush Administration's position in the infamous Bybee Memo in which the
Office of Legal Counsel argued that the torture statute-18 U.S.C.S. § 2340A-
unconstitutionally infringes upon executive power. Kevin Jon Heller, Let's Call
Vol. 72260
Little scholarly attention has been given to the legality of the
Obama Administration's actions under the foreign-murder statute,
which prohibits a U.S. citizen from killing another U.S. citizen in a
foreign jurisdiction. 39 Because the C.I.A. is a civilian governmental
agency, any C.I.A. operative who kills a U.S. citizen outside the
United States is potentially guilty of foreign murder.41 Indeed,
high-ranking officials within the Administration, including the
President would share a certain measure of criminal responsibility,
as well.4 Therefore the issue is whether there are any legal
grounds that would exempt the Administration's actions from the
prohibition imposed by the foreign-murder statute.
One such exemption may be that the foreign-murder statute is
inapplicable because the U.S. is currently involved in the "War on
Terror." 43 The legality of actions taken in furtherance of the War
on Terror must be judged under the laws of war, as opposed to
domestic law." The argument is simple: if al-Awlaki is a terrorist,
then the laws of war might permit his assassination.45
The Obama Administration argues that the laws of war,
coupled with the force authorized by Congress in the AUMF,
provide legal justification for using lethal force against those
whom the Administration designates as terrorists. 46 Legal Advisor
Killing al-Awlaki What it is-Murder, OPINIo JURIs, (Apr. 8, 2010, 10:34 P.M),
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/04/08/lets-call-killing-al-awlaki-what-it-is-murder/.
Critics have attacked the memorandum for the poor quality of its legal
arguments. See Morrison, supra note 9, at 1231.
38. See generally Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S.
Counterterrorism Strategy and Law (Brookings Institution, Georgetown
University Law Center & the Hoover Institution, Working Paper, 2009), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract-1415070.
39. 18U.S.C.§ 1119(2006).
40. The National Security Act outlines the responsibilities of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA is under the umbrella of the National
Security Council and reports to the President. See VICTOR MARCHETTI & JOHN
D. MARKs, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE 325-26 (1974); see also
National Security Act of 1947, 80 Pub. L. No. 253, § 102, 61 Stat. 495, 497-99.
41. See Heller, supra note 37.
42. Id; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (aiding and abetting or otherwise
inducing the commission of a federal crime is punishable); 18 U.S.C. § 371
(2006) (conspiracy to violate federal law is punishable).
43. See Heller, supra note 37.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Cf Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 26 at 4-
5 ("In addition to the AUMF, there are other legal bases under U.S. and
international law for the President to authorize the use of force against al-Qaeda
and AQAP . . . ."); see also Shane, supra note 28 (noting that "Obama
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to the U.S. Department of State Harold Koh made precisely such
an argument:
As I have explained, as a matter of international law, the
United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well
as the Taliban and associated forces . . .. [I]n this ongoing
armed conflict, the United States has the authority under
international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to
use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including
by targeting persons .... [I]ndividuals who are part of such
an armed group are belligerents and, therefore, lawful
targets under international law.4 7
This statement and others by the Obama Administration raise
important issues about whether and to what extent the President
may rely on international law to trump domestic law during
wartime. In particular, the question of whether international law
allows the President to ignore the foreign-murder statute has
profound implications for the War on Terror.
B. Relevant Statutes & Treaties
1. The Foreign-murder Statute
Scholars have given little attention to the foreign-murder
statute. The statute is implicated in a few cases, most notably in a
Fifth Circuit decision in 2003.48 The court summarized the
"essential elements" of foreign murder: "[1] A person who, being a
national of the United States, [2] kills or attempts to kill [3] a
national of the United States [4] while such national is outside the
United States but within the jurisdiction of another country shall be
punished ....
2. Authorization for Use ofMilitary Force (AUMF)
On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda operatives hijacked
commercial airliners and attacked prominent targets in the United
administration officials have argued that Mr. Awlaki . . . has essentially joined
the enemy in a time of war. The government does not need a court's permission
to kill an enemy soldier. . . .").
47. Harold Hongju Koh, Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law: Washington, DC (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/1/
releases/remarks/1 39119.htm.
48. United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2003).
49. Id. at 533.
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States.5o Approximately 3,000 people were killed.5' One week
later, Congress passed the AUMF, a joint resolution authorizing
the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001 ... in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations, or persons.52
The AUMF is the primary legal basis by which the
Government has justified its military action in Afghanistan and
other counter-terrorism operations. 53 It is therefore unsurprising
that the AUMF has been central to a number of legal controversies
over the exercise of executive power. One such controversy
involves the President's claimed power to detain enemy
combatants despite the fact that the AUMF does not expressly give
him such authority. 54 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and a plurality held that the AUMF provides an
adequate legal basis for the President to detain enemy
combatants. 5 The Court concluded that the statute confers
powers-including detention-that are implicit to its fundamental
purpose.56
3. International Law-The Geneva Conventions
The modern laws of war (sometimes called "the law of
international armed conflict" or "international humanitarian law")
have developed through a series of treaties, most notably the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and the four Geneva Conventions of
1949." These treaties govern the treatment of detainees and others
subjected to enemy authority during an armed conflict.58 The
50. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
5 1. Id.
52. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
53. David Mortlock, Definite Detention: The Scope of the President's
Authority to Detain Enemy Combatants, 4 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 375, 377
(2010).
54. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. at 224.
55. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
56. See id.
57. Christopher Greenwood, The Law of War (International Humanitarian
Law), in INTERNATIONAL LAW 783, 784 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006).
58. See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva
Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REv 97, 108-11 (2004).
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United States ratified all four Geneva Conventions on August 2,
1955.59
In addressing who may take part in hostilities, the laws of war
distinguish between lawful combatants and civilians.60 The
distinction is important for two reasons. First, combatants are
legitimate targets, whereas civilians are not. 61 Second, combatants
are afforded "combatant privilege"-combatants cannot be
prosecuted for engaging in certain acts that would be unlawful for
civilians (such as killing soldiers). 62
Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III sets forth criteria
distinguishing civilians from combatants. In general, to be a
combatant, a person must be:
(a) commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) [displaying] a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) carrying arms openly;
(d) conducting [hist operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
In June 1977, two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions were adopted.64 Although the United States signed
the Additional Protocols, the Senate has yet to ratify them.65
C. Recent Developments-Al-Bihani v. Obama
In January 2010, a three-judge panel for the D.C. Circuit Court
issued its opinion in al-Bihani v. Obama-an opinion that could
have profound implications on the extent to which international
law affects the President's actions under the AUMF. 66 The facts of
the case are fairly straightforward. Al-Bihani worked as a cook for
the 55th Arab Brigade, a paramilitary group associated with the
Taliban.6 7 After a U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan, the 55th
retreated and eventually surrendered to the Northern Alliance. 68
The U.S. military sent al-Bihani to Guantinamo for detention and
59. ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR 361 (3d ed. 2000).
60. Greenwood, supra note 57, at 794.
6 1. Id.
62. See id.
63. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; see generally INGRID
DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 136 (2000); ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 59, at
246.
64. DETTER, supra note 63, at 136.
65. Jinks & Sloss, supra note 58, at 111.
66. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
67. Id. at 869.
68. Id.
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interrogation.6 9 Al-Bihani challenged his detention on multiple
grounds.70
The D.C. Circuit Court ultimately affirmed the district court's
denial of al-Bihani's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 7 For the
purposes of this Comment, the most important part of the opinion
is the court's ruling on al-Bihani's contention that the laws of war
prohibited his detention. Before discussing the substance of al-
Bihani's intemational-law-based claims, the court rejected its
central premise:
[T]he war powers granted by the AUMF and other statutes
are [not] limited by the international laws of war . . . .
[W]hile the international laws of war are helpful to courts
when identifying the general set of war powers to which the
AUMF speaks, their lack of controlling legal force and firm
definition render their use both inapposite and inadvisable
when courts seek to determine the limits of the President's
war powers.72
Judges Brown and Kavanaugh joined this part of the opinion in
full, whereas Judge Williams wrote separately to express
reservations.73
Al-Bihani petitioned for rehearing en banc. 74 The Government
urged the court to leave its original ruling undisturbed. The
Government argued that although the court found the laws of war
inapplicable, the court nonetheless rejected the merits of al-
Bihani's laws-of-war arguments.7 5 Interestingly, however, the
Government took a position wholly inconsistent with the
majority's statement that the AUMF was unconstrained by
international law: "The Government interprets its detention
authority under the AUMF to be informed by the laws of war."76
This interpretation, according to the Government, conformed with
"longstanding Supreme Court precedent" that statutes should be
construed "if possible" as consistent with international law, and
69. Id.
70. Id. at 868 (Al-Bihani "claims his detention is unauthorized by statute
and the procedures of his habeas proceeding were constitutionally infirm.").
7 1. Id. at 88 1.
72. Id. at 871 (internal citations omitted).
73. See id. at 885 (in his concurring opinion, Judge Williams questioned
whether the majority's position that the AUMF is not limited by international
law is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld).
74. See generally Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d I (D.C. 2010).
75. Response to Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1, Al-
Bihani, 619 F.3d I (No. 09-5051).
76. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the AUMF in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.77
A full D.C. Circuit Court voted unanimously to deny al-
Bihani's petition for rehearing.7 8 Seven of the nine justices (none
of whom were on the original three-judge panel) voted against en
banc review "to determine the role of international law-of-war
principles in interpreting the AUMF because, as the various
opinions issued in this case indicate, the panel's discussion of that
question is not necessary to the disposition of the merits."79 Thus,
the panel's discussion of the relationship between international law
and the AUMF may have been undermined. Indeed, one
commentator opined that "[t]he reality . . . is now that there is no
controlling precedent in the Circuit on the role that international
law plays in defining the President's powers of detention."80
II. YELLOW LIGHT: IS KILLING AL-AWLAKI PROHIBITED BY THE
FOREIGN-MURDER STATUTE?
The al-Bihani decision demonstrates the lack of judicial
consensus over whether a president's war powers under the AUMF
are affected by the international laws of war. Resolution of this
unsettled area of law has profound implications for the
Government's conduct in the War on Terror, particularly with
respect to U.S. citizens such as al-Awlaki.
If the Government is correct that the laws of war inform the
President's authority under the AUMF, then it is not wholly
illogical for the Obama Administration to invoke the laws of war
to sanction the targeting of al-Awlaki.x If, however, the majority
opinion in al-Bihani is a correct statement of law-if the laws of
war do not limit the President's power under the AUMF-then
invoking the laws of war seems problematic: for if those laws do
not constrain the President's powers under the AUMF, then how
can they provide legal justification for actions taken pursuant to
the AUMF?
In addressing whether the laws of war affect the President's
authority under the AUMF, this Comment extrapolates from the
framework of Justice Kavanaugh's concurring opinion denying al-
Bihani's petition for an en banc rehearing. Two fundamental
77. Id. at 7-8.
78. Id. at 1.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Lyle Denniston, Diminishing a Precedent, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 31, 2010,
12:28 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/08/diminishing-a-precedent/.
81. In this scenario, the question then becomes whether the laws of war
actually apply to al-Awlaki's case.
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questions are addressed: (1) whether international law norms
contained in treaties to which the U.S. is a party are automatically
a part of U.S. domestic law, and (2) whether Congress has
incorporated the relevant treaty norms in subsequent legislation.82
A. Are International Law Norms Automatically a Part of U.S.
Domestic Law?
This section discusses the domestic status of treaties in the
United States. The contemporary approach presumes that treaties83
are not self-executing absent evidence to the contrary. The
Supreme Court adopted this position in Medellin v. Texas and, in
so, doing provided an authoritative framework for interpreting the
effect of treaties in domestic law.84 Under the treaty interpretation
principles established in Medellin, the laws of war that the Obama
Administration must invoke to justify violating the foreign-murder
statute lack binding domestic force.
1. Pre-Medellin Treaty Status in US. Domestic Law
The U.S. Constitution mentions "treaties" several times. One
important reference is found in Article II, Section 2, which gives
the President the power to negotiate treaties by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate.8 6 Perhaps the most significant reference
is found in Article VI, Section 2 (the Supremacy Clause), which
states that "[a]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."8 7 The text of the Constitution thus suggests that all treaties
negotiated by the President and ratified by the Senate are domestic
law.
U.S. courts, however, have drawn a distinction between treaties
that are self-executing and those that are non-self-executing.8 The
82. See Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 9-10 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
83. See discussion infra Part II.A. 1.
84. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
85. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
86. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
87. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
88. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008) ("This Court has
long recognized the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as
domestic law, and those that-while they constitute international law
commitments-do not by themselves function as binding federal law."); Igartua
de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[Treaties] may
comprise international commitments, but they are not domestic law unless
Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an
intention that it be 'self-executing' and is ratified on these terms. The law to this
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precise nature of this distinction, and indeed its very existence, has
been a subject of intense debate. 89 Because this distinction is
entrenched in U.S. law, any consideration of the domestic status of
a treaty must address this issue.
The Supreme Court has defined self-executing treaties as
"treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law" and non-
self-executing treaties as treaties that "do not by themselves
function as binding federal law."90 The origin of the self-execution
doctrine is often traced to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Foster v. Neilson, an 1829 Supreme Court case involving land
rights under a treaty between Spain and the United States.91 Courts
frequently cite the following language in Foster: "[The U.S.
Constitution] declares a treaty to be the law of the land. [A treaty]
is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to
an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the
aid of any legislative provision."92 As one commentator notes,
"The Foster holding is easier to describe than to apply." 93 In
particular, scholars and courts differ as to whether Foster merits a
broad or narrow interpretation. A narrow interpretation of Foster
supports a presumption in favor of treaties as self-executing: 94 A
treaty should only be declared non-self-executing when there is
affirmative evidence that the treaty was not intended to have
domestic effect.95
effect is longstanding."); Avero Belg. Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73,
78-79 (2d Cir. 2005) ("A self-executing treaty becomes 'the law of this land,'
only after it has been (1) duly consented to by the Senate, and (2) ratified by the
President.") (internal citations omitted); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414
F.3d 233, 257 n.34 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Self-executing treaties are those that
'immediately create rights and duties of private individuals which are
enforceable and [are] to be enforced by domestic tribunals.' Non-self-executing
treaties 'require implementing action by the political branches of government or
. . . are otherwise unsuitable for judicial application."') (internal citations
omitted).
89. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-
executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995); Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine
ofSelf-executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. INT'L
L. J. 627 (1986); Alona E. Evans, Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-executing
Treaties, 45 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 66 (1951).
90. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504.
91. Aya Gruber, Who's Afraid of Geneva Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 1042
(2007); Vazquez, supra note 89, at 700.
92. Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (emphasis added).
93. Vazquez, supra note 89, at 703.
94. Curtis A. Bradley, Agora: Medellin: Intent, Presumptions, and Non-
self-executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 540, 545 (2008).
95. Gruber, supra note 91, at 1050.
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Over the past 100 years, the Supreme Court has said very little
about self-execution. Lower courts, however, have recent@developed a rather expansive view of the self-execution doctrine.
The "modem" self-execution doctrine requires evidence of intent
to make treaties enforceable as domestic law.98 In other words, a
treaty is presumed non-self-executing absent any evidence that it
was intended to be self-executing. 99 This development is
significant because most nations do not address matters of
domestic enforceability in the provisions of treaties.100  A
presumption in favor of or against self-execution will thus
ultimately determine the judicial enforceability of the treaty in the
vast majority of circumstances.' It appears that the Supreme
Court in Medellin v. Texas endorsed the lower courts' presumption
against self-execution and, in doing so, provided a framework for
analyzing the domestic effect of treaties.
2. Post-Medellin Treaty Status in U.S. Domestic Law
In Medellin v. Texas, the Court addressed whether the
International Court of Justice's (ICJ) Judgment in Case
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals was binding on
state and federal courts in the United States.102 The petitioner
argued that three treaties--the Optional Protocol of the Vienna
Convention, Article 94 of the United Nations Charter, and the ICJ
statute-obligated U.S. courts to treat the ICJ Judgment as binding
law.103 After examining the relevant treaties, the Court held that
96. Id. at 1044.
97. See id. at 1050.
98. Id. See also Igartua-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st
Cir. 2005) ("[treaties] are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-
executing' and is ratified on these terms.") (emphasis added); Sei Fujii v. State
of Cal., 38 Cal. 2d 718, 722 (Cal. 1952) ("In order for a treaty provision to be
operative without the aid of implementing legislation and to have the force and
effect of a statute, it must appear that the framers of the treaty intended to
prescribe a rule that, standing alone, would be enforceable in the courts.")
(emphasis added). Cf United States v. Nai Fook Li, 206 F.3d 56, 67 (1st Cir.
2000) ("The label 'self-executing' usually is applied to any treaty that according
to its terms takes effect upon ratification and requires no separate implementing
statute.") (emphasis added).
99. Vazquez, supra note 89, at 708.
100. Id. at 709.
101. Id.
102. Medellin v. United States, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008).
103. Id. at 507; see also Margaret E. McGuinness, International Decisions:
Medellin v. Texas, 102 Am. J. INT'L L. 622, 624 (2008).
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the ICJ judgment did not bind domestic courts.104 The Court's
analysis provides guidance for interpreting the domestic effect of
treaties in the United States.
The Court's analysis began with a statement that "[t]he
interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins
with its text."' 05 Although the Court focused primarily on the text
of the relevant treaties, it did not adopt a purely textual
approach. 106 Rather, the Court treated the self-execution issue as a
matter of intent; the text being the primary indication of such107intent. o The ultimate issue, the Court suggested, is whether the
text of the treaty evinces an intent that its provisions be self-
executing. 108
One of the longstanding questions about the self-execution
doctrine is whose intent matters. 0 9 Some commentators argue that
the intent of all the ratifying nations should be considered, while
others argue that only the intent of the President and Senate
matter. 0 At first llance, it may appear that the Court adopted the
former position.' However, careful scrutiny suggests that the
decision is best read as endorsing the view that the intent of U.S.
treaty-makers is most important. Curtis Bradley, a leading scholar
in the area, offers persuasive arguments in support of this
reading.11 2 According to Bradley, many passages in the Court's
opinion focus solely on the intent of the President and the
Senate. 113 Second, in examining the ratification history of the U.N.
Charter, the Court focuses on internal U.S. debates rather than on
the collective negotiating history.14 Third, the Court's test for
104. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507.
105. Id
106. Bradley, supra note 94, at 543.
107. Id
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id, at 544.
112. See id. at 543-45.
113. Id ("The Court stated that '[o]ur cases simply require courts to decide
whether a treaty's terms reflect a determination by the President who negotiated
it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect.' The Court
also noted that 'we have held treaties to be self-executing when the textual
provisions indicate that the President and Senate intended for the agreement to
have domestic effect.' And, in summarizing its finding of non-self-execution,
the Court explained that '[n]othing in the text, background, negotiating and
drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President
or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an
international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by 'many of our most
fundamental constitutional protections. "') (internal citations omitted).
114. Id. at 544.
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whether a treaty is self-executing supports such a reading." 5
Finally, a U.S.-intent-based focus is persuasive because lower
courts have consistently allowed the Senate to qualify its
ratification of treaties with non-self-execution declarations.116
A more significant aspect of Medellin is its input in the
ongoing debate over whether a treaty is presumptively self-
executing or non-self-executing. As Bradley notes, the Court
certainly seems to have rejected a strong presumption in favor of
self-execution. He contends, however, that it would be a stretch
to find that the Court has established a presumption against self-
executing treaties. 1 9
Bradley's contention is problematic for several reasons. First,
some statements in the decision support a presumption against self-
executing treaties.120 Second, the Supreme Court's citation to the
lower courts' decisions finding treaties presumptively non-self-
executing suggests that the Court has implicitly endorsed the
trend.12 1 Third, lower courts cite Medellin as establishing that
treaties, in the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, are
115. The Court believed that its test for self-execution would not drastically
affect U.S. treaty enforcement. However, because there is almost never an
express collective intent by signatory nations that treaty provisions be self-
executing, treaties would rarely be self-executing, and thus, the Court's test
would drastically affect U.S. treaty enforcement. Id.
116. If self-execution were a matter of the parties' collective intent, then a
non-self-execution declaration by the Senate would have to be interpreted as
reflective of the sentiments of all ratifying parties, a dubious proposition. Id.
117. Some commentators contend that courts should apply a presumption in
favor of treaties as self-executing. Id. at 545; see, e.g., LouIs HENKIN, U.S.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAW AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 201 (2d ed.
1996); Jordan J. Paust, Self-executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 768
(1988); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Agora: Medellin: Less Than Zero?, 102 AM. J.
INT'L L. 563, 572 (2008). Other commentators, most notably John Yoo, have
argued that treaties are presumptively non-self-executing. Bradley, supra note
94, at 543; see, e.g., John C. Yoo, Rejoinder: Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A
Textual and Structural Defense ofNon-self-execution, 99 COLuM. L. REv. 2218,
2254-57 (1999).
118. Bradley, supra note 94, at 546.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521 (2008) ("[O]ur cases
simply require courts to decide whether a treaty's terms reflect a determination
by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty
has domestic effect."); id. at 519 ("[W]e have held treaties to be self-executing
when the textual provisions indicate that the President and Senate intended for
the agreement to have domestic effect."). See also Vazquez, supra note 117, at
570 (finding that "[t]here are several statements in [Medellin] suggesting that the
majority believed treaties to be presumptively non-self-executing.").
121. See, e.g., Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505 (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v.
United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005)).
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non-self-executing. 122 Thus, it appears that a more accurate reading
of Medellin establishes a presumption against self-executing
treaties.
The Medellin decision raises yet another issue regarding
treaties: If a treaty is non-self-executing, what effect, if any, does it
have on domestic law? 2 3 The Court gives little guidance on this
issue.124 On one hand, the decision contains many statements
equating non-self-execution with lack of domestic legal status.12 5
On the other hand, the Court at times equates non-self-execution
only with lack of judicial enforceability.' This distinction may be
particularly important in a debate over whether the President is
bound by the Constitution to comply with a non-self-executing
treaty. 12 Ultimately, however, whether non-self-executing means
lacking judicial enforceability or lacking the force of domestic law
122. See Elsevier B.V. v. United Health Grp., Inc., 09 Civ. 2124 (WHP), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3261, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("While treaties may comprise
international commitment ... they are not domestic law unless Congress has either
enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be
'self-executing' and is ratified on these terms.") (quoting Medellin, 552 U.S. at
505); see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("A self-
executing treaty is one that 'reflect[s] a determination by the President who
negotiated and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect."')
(quoting Medellin, 552 U.S. at 521) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
123. Bradley, supra note 94, at 547-48.
124. Id
125. Id. at 548; see also Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505 (non-self-executing
treaties "do not by themselves function as binding federal law"); Id. at n.2
("What we mean by 'self-executing' is that the treaty has automatic domestic
effect as federal law upon ratification.").
126. Bradley, supra note 94, at 548; see also Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505
("[N]ot all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal
law enforceable in United States courts.") (emphasis added); id. at n.2 ("The
question we confront here is whether the Avena judgment has automatic
domestic legal effect such that the judgment of its own force applies in state and
federal courts.") (emphasis added); id at 513 ("The pertinent international
agreements, therefore, do not provide for implementation of ICJ judgments
through direct enforcement in domestic courts.") (emphasis added).
127. Bradley, supra note 94, at 548. One argument is that Article II of the
Constitution requires the President to faithfully execute the laws of the United
States. If a non-self-executing treaty means only that the treaty is not judicially
enforceable, then the treaty is nonetheless a law of the United States, as dictated
by the Supremacy Clause. Therefore, the President must enforce the treaty as the
supreme law of the land, regardless of whether it is self-executing. See
Mortlock, supra note 53, at 380. See also HENKIN, supra note 117, at 203-04
(explaining that in Foster, Marshall did not suggest that a non-self-executing
treaty "[i]s not law for the President or for Congress. [Rather,] [it] is their
obligation to see to it that [the treaty] is faithfully implemented; it is their
obligation to do what is necessary to make it a rule for the courts.").
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could be purely an academic issue.128 For if a treaty is not
enforceable in court, there is little to stop the legislature or
executive from violating it.
In summary, Medellin sets forth an authoritative framework for
interpreting the effect of a treaty on U.S. domestic law. The most
important issue is whether the text of a treaty provides affirmative
evidence of intent by U.S. treaty-makers that the treaty is to have
domestic effect. In the absence of such evidence, a treaty is
presumed non-self-executing in which case it has little, if any,
domestic legal effect. The treaty interpretation principles
articulated in Medellin are important in determining how to
interpret the treaty provisions at issue in al-Awlaki's case.
3. The Medellin Paradigm and the International Laws of War
Because the Obama Administration has invoked the law
regarding legal combatants as a justification for its tageted killing
program, 1949 Geneva Convention III is implicated. Using the
Medellin analysis, it is necessary to examine whether the rules
regarding legal combatants are self-executing.130
The first step is to examine the text. Common Article 1 states
that "[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to
ensure respect for the present Conventions in all circumstances." 3 1
As Judge Kavanaugh argues in his concurring opinion in al-Bihani,
the phrase "undertake to respect" is similar to the phrase
"undertakes to comply," the operative language of Article 94 of the
U.N. Charter.132 The Court in Medellin found that such language in
Article 94, as opposed to the use of words such as "shall" or
"must," envisaged further action by the legislature in order to give
effect to the ICJ judgment.133 Under this analysis, it is likely that
the language in Common Article 1 also contemlates future
legislative action and is therefore non-self-executing. 4 Even if the
foregoing analysis of Common Article 1 is flawed, the text does
128. Cf Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM L. REv.
2154, 2185 (1999) ("I am inclined to question the status as 'law' of a norm that
can be disregarded with no legal consequences.").
129. See supra note 47.
130. Note that it is well established that some parts of a treaty may be self-
executing while others may not. See Vazquez, supra note 128, at 2188.
131. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 59, at 244.
132. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring). Article 94 reads as follows: "Each Member of the United Nations
undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in
any case to which it is a party." U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1,
133. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 20 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 19-20.
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not provide affirmative evidence of an intent for self-execution as
required by Medellin.
Article 4 of 1949 Geneva Convention III sets forth criteria that
must be satisfied for a civilian to attain lawful combatant status.' 35
The text does not suggest that the article was intended to be self-
executing. 136 Again, operating under the Medellin presumption that
treaties are non-self-executing, it is unlikely that Article 4 would
be deemed self-executing.
Although Medellin emphasizes textual analysis, it also allows
for the use of other sources, particularly ratification history, to
ascertain the intent of U.S. treaty-makers.' 37 There are no explicit
declarations in the congressional record indicating that the Senate
intended the Geneva Conventions to be self-executing.138
B. Circumventing Non-self-execution-Has Congress Incorporated
the Laws of War?
Even though the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions
are non-self-executing, they may become U.S. domestic law if they
are incorporated by separate legislation.139 As the Supreme Court
notes: "the responsibility for transforming an international
obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic
law falls to Congress."' 40 It is undeniable that this responsibility
belongs solely to Congress. Once a non-self-executing treaty is
ratified, "[i]t can only become domestic law in the same way as
any other law-through passage of legislation by both Houses of
Congress, combined with either the President's signature or a
congressional override of a Presidential veto."'41
Thus, the issue is whether Congress has incorporated in
separate legislation the particular laws of war on which the Obama
135. See discussion infra Part I.A.3.
136. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364
137. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008) ("Because a treaty ratified
by the United States is 'an agreement among sovereign powers,' we have also
considered as 'aids to its interpretation' the negotiation and drafting history of
the treaty.") (emphasis added).
138. Gruber, supra note 91, at 1054; see also David Sloss, Availability of U.S.
Court to Detainee at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base-Reach of Habeas Corpus-
Executive Power in War on Terror, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 788, n.66 (2004).
139. Cf Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("When the
stipulations [of a treaty] are not self-executing they can only be enforced
pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect.").
140. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 525-26. See also Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
141. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 526.
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Administration must rely to justify violating the foreign-murder
statute. Neither the UCMJ nor the AUMF incorporates those laws.
1. Incorporation of the Laws of War in the UCMJ
One may argue that the laws of war have attained the status of
U.S. domestic law because Congress has incorporated those laws
in the UCMJ.14 2 Proponents of this view will point to the Supreme
Court's holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.14 3
The plaintiff in Hamdan was captured during the 2001 military
invasion of Afghanistan and was later transferred to Guantinamo
Bay.144 Over a year later, the President deemed him eligible for
trial by military commission.145 Hamdan argued that the military
commission convened by the President lacked the authority to try
him.146 The Supreme Court granted certiorari not only to determine
this issue but also whether Hamdan could seek protection under the
Geneva Conventions.147 The Court eventually invalidated
Hamdan's tribunal on the basis that it violated both domestic law
and the Geneva Conventions.14 8
The Court began its analysis by stating that the AUMF and the
UCMJ sanctioned the use of military commissions.1 49 Article 21 of
the UCMJ reads as follows:
21. Jurisdiction of courts-martial not exclusive.
The provisions of this code conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving military
commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of
concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses
that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by such
142. See e.g., Anthony Clark Arend, Who's Afraid of the Geneva Conventions?
Treaty Interpretation in the Wake of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 22 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 709, 718 (2007).
143. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Domestic
Enforcement ofInternational Law in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 28 (October
15, 2007) (arguing that the Court found that the Geneva Conventions were
applicable to Hamdan's case "whether or not they are independently judicially
enforceable because Congress [chose] to incorporate the international laws of
war into the Uniform Code"); Arend, supra note 142, at 718.
144. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 567.
147. Gruber, supra note 91, at 1034.
148. Id.
149. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594.
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military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals.' 5 0
The Court construed the reference to the law of war in Article
21 as mandating compliance with procedural requirements of the
law of war.15 1 The commissions established by the President did
not meet these requirements.1 52
There are a number of reasons to interpret the Court's holding
as establishing that the laws of war apply only in the context of
military tribunals. First, one can reason pro subjecta materia by
examining the placement of Article 21 in the UCMJ. The Article is
located in Part IV entitled "Courts-martial Jurisdiction," a section
that describes the jurisdiction of different types of courts-
martial.'5 3 Second, one can arrive at this conclusion by examining
the text of Article 21, which asserts that the overlapping of
jurisdiction between military commissions and courts-martial does
not deprive the former of concurrent jurisdiction.154 One way that
these tribunals obtain jurisdiction is when the offender is accused
of violating a law of war.'5 5 Thus the law-of-war reference controls
only when assessing whether one of the enumerated tribunals has
jurisdiction. Third, most, if not all, of the Court's references to the
relationship between Article 21 and the laws of war occur in the
context of a discussion about the circumstances in which military
commissions are justified.15 1
150. Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1950, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 64 Stat.
107, 115 (1950) (emphasis added).
151. Curtis A. Bradley, Military Commissions Act of 2006: The Military
Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva Conventions, 101 AM. J.
INT'L L. 322, 326 (2007). See also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631-32.
152. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635.
153. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 64 Stat. 107, 115 (1950).
154. Id. Cf Christopher C. Burris, Time For Congressional Action: The
Necessity of Delineating the Jurisdictional Responsibilities of Federal District
Courts, Courts-Martial, and Military Commissions to Try Violations of the Laws
of War, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REv. 4, 18 (2005) ("[I]n Article 21 [of the] UCMJ,
Congress specifically acknowledged that military commissions' jurisdiction can
and will overlap with courts-martial.").
155. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 64 Stat. 107, 115 (1950).
156. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594-55 ("[T]he UCMJ . . . acknowledge[s] a
general Presidential authority to convene military commissions in circumstances
where justified under the 'Constitution and laws,' including the law of war."); id
at n.31 ("If nothing else, Article 21 of the UCMJ requires that the President
comply with the law of war in his use of military commissions."); id. at 603 ("At a
minimum, the Government must make a substantial showing that the crime for
which it seeks to try a defendant by military commission is acknowledged to be an
offense against the law of war."); id. at 613 ("The UCMJ conditions the
President's use of military commissions on compliance . . . with the 'rules and
precepts of the law of nations."') (quoting Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
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Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Hamdan, President
Bush began consulting with Congress about possible legislation
that would arant a broader authorization for use of military
commissions. ' In October 2006, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act (MCA).15 8 In many ways, the MCA repudiated
the Hamdan decision.159 The MCA explicitly sanctions the use of
military commissions and makes clear that the UCMJ does not
apply to such commissions unless the MCA specifically allows it.160
Whereas the Court in Hamdan found that the UCMJ imposed
international law-based restrictions on military commissions, the
MCA rendered the Geneva Conventions judicially unenforceable.161
Furthermore, whereas the Court insisted on independently
determining whether a government's acts were consistent with
international law, the MCA gives the President exclusive authority
to interpret the Geneva Conventions beyond grave breaches.
Thus, the MCA casts serious doubt over the extent to which
international law applies in the context of military commissions.
In summary, the UCMJ cannot be read to incorporate the 1949
Geneva Conventions in toto. Instead, the UCMJ has incorporated
the laws of war only to the extent that they are applicable in the
context of military commissions. In fact, even this characterization
of the applicability of the laws of war may be an overstatement in
light of the MCA's apparent repudiation of the Hamdan decision.
2. Incorporation of the Laws of War in the A UMF
A more plausible argument is that the laws of war have been
incorporated in the AUMF. Ultimately, however, this argument is
unconvincing as well.
The starting point for discerning Congress's intent to
incorporate the laws of war in the AUMF is the text of the
statute. 163 The AUMF affords the President broad discretion with
respect to methods of force, use of military resources, choice of
157. Hathaway, supra note 143, at 31.
158. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006); see also Hathaway, supra note 143, at 32.
159. Hathaway, supra note 143, at 32.
160. Bradley, supra note 151, at 327. See also Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600, 2602 (2006), § 948(b), (c).
161. See Hathaway, supra note 143, at 32; Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1,
21-22 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also Pub. L. 109-366,
120 Stat. 2600 (2006), SEC.5.(a).
162. Hathaway, supra note 143, at 32; Gruber, supra note 91, at 1057; see
also Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2632 (2006), SEC.6(a)(3)(A).
163. Cf Lamie v. United States, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) ("The starting
point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text.").
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targets, and timing.' The scope of authority is comparable to
previous congressional authorizations of force.16 5 Congress has
enacted many statutes, including war-related statutes, which
expressly incorporate international law norms.1 66 Thus, it is hardly
surprising that the Supreme Court has recognized that "[C]ongress
knows how to accord domestic effect to international obligations
when it desires such a result."' 67 Crucially, the AUMF does not
explicitly reference international law.' 68 Viewed against this
background, "the silence strongly suggests that Congress did not
intend to impose . . . international-law constraints on the
President's war-making authority."169
Some scholars, such as Derek Jinks and David Sloss, suggest
that the phrase "necessary and appropriate" in the AUMF
implicitly demonstrates congressional intent to impose
international law-based limits on the President's authority.' 70 Their
first argument is that, because U.S. law criminalizes many
violations of the Geneva Conventions, it would be difficult to read
the AUMF as repealing these statutes "with a single, sweeping
resolution."' 7' But, even if this argument is tenable, the
criminalization of certain violations of the laws of war surely does
not imply that Congress intended to incorporate all remaining laws
of war with the simple phrase "necessary and appropriate." A
related contention by Jinks and Sloss is that, because Congress has
separately incorporated multiple U.S. treaty obligations, "the best
reading of the [AUMFI is that the law of war delimits the scope of
'appropriate' force."' 2 However, it is questionable whether
incorporation of certain treaty norms supports the notion that
164. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 24 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see generally
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
165. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047, 2071 (2005); see also Al-
Bihani, 619 F.3d at 24-25 ("[T]he AUMF resembles several prior American war
declarations and authorizations, such as those during World War II.")
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
166. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 25 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). One example is
the War Crimes Act, which criminalizes certain wartime conduct that violates
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3) (2006);
see generally Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 13-16 (describing various statutes in which
Congress codified international law norms) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
167. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522 (2008).
168. See generally Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
169. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 25 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
170. See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 58, at 130-32.
171. Id. at 130.
172. Id.
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Congress intended to incorporate in the AUMF those laws of war
that were not previously incorporated.
A more plausible argument is that the phrase "necessary and
appropriate" emphasizes the breadth of Congress's authorization,
rather than limits the President's power. A similar phrase in the
Constitution provides reliable support for this proposition.' 73
Specifically, in light of wide acceptance that the Necessary and
Proper Clause enlarges rather than diminishes Congress' power, 7 4
it seems incongruous to conclude that Congress used similar
language in the AUMF to constrain presidential authority. 75
Rather, the phrase "necessary and appropriate" supports the
conclusion that Congress intended to create broad authorization as
to the means and use of force. 7 6
At the very least, the words "necessary and appropriate" are
ambiguous. A look at the AUMF's legislative history helps to
resolve this ambiguity. Specifically, there is scant evidence that
Congress intended the laws of war to constrain presidential
authority under the AUMF.17 7 To the contrary, the House and
Senate debates suggest that Congress intended to grant the
President broad authority.'7 8 These debates reinforce the AUMF's
173. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 165, at 2081.
174. See id.; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 420 (1819) (finding that
the Necessary and Proper Clause "purport[s] to enlarge, not to diminish the
powers vested in the government. It purports to be an additional power, not a
restriction on those already granted."); United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct.
1949, 1956 (2010) ("[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad
authority to enact federal legislation .... [it] makes clear that the Constitution's
grants of specific federal legislative authority are accompanied by broad power
to enact laws."); see generally U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
175. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 165, at 2081.
176. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring).
177. There are, however, a few isolated references to the laws of war in the
House and Senate debates surrounding the AUMF: "There is one way and one
way only, Mr. Speaker, to respond to acts of war, and that is to declare war.
Give the President the tools, the absolute flexibility he needs under international
law and The Hague Convention."147 CONG. REc. 17,126 (2001) (statement of
Rep. Barr.); "The authorization we give the President today is not unlimited.
Congress will monitor progress of our military actions and work with the
President to ensure that our actions under this resolution are necessary and
appropriate, consistent with our values, in conjunction with our friends and
allies, and in accordance with international laws." Id. at 17,146 (statement of
Rep. Clayton).
178. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 26-27 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see, e.g., 147
CONG. REC. 17,111 (2001) (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("[W]e as Members of
Congress now have a duty to perform. We must grant the President the fullest
authority to employ all of the resources of the United States . . . to make war on
our enemy."); id. (statement of Rep. Lantos) ("The resolution before us
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text and do not indicate that Congress intended to incorporate the
laws of war. 179
In its brief in opposition to al-Bihani's petition for an en banc
rehearing, the Government made two separate arguments as to why
the AUMF incorporates the laws of war. 80 One argument focused
on the plurality's opinion in Hamdi, in which the Government
cited the following sentence: "[W]e understand Congress' grant of
authority for the use of 'necessary and appropriate force' [in the
AUMF] to include the authority to detain for the duration of the
relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding
law-of-war principles."
This argument loses force when examined in the full context of
the Court's opinion. The highlighted sentence was a response to
Hamdi's contention that the AUMF did not authorize indefinite or
perpetual detention.182 Although the plurality agreed with Hamdi
that Congress did not intend to authorize indefinite detention, it
found that Congress did intend to include the authority to detain
for a limited duration.' 83 One of the interpretive aids in coming to
this conclusion was the law of war. In other words,
"[a]cknowledging that the AUMF says nothing about detention,
the Court reasoned that because of the universality of the 'law of
war,' which includes the detention of fighters, Congress must have
intended the President to have the power to detain U.S. citizen
enemy combatants."' 84 Thus the Court looked to the laws of war
not because they had been incorporated by the AUMF, but rather
as a tool of statutory interpretation.' 85
empowers the President to bring to bear the full force of American power abroad
in our struggle against the scourge of international terrorism."); id. at 17,114
(statement of Rep. Norton) ("The point is to give the President the authority to
do what he has to do . . . . But the truth is that under our Constitution and
existing law, when the country is attacked, the President's power is almost
limitless."); id. at 17,130 (statement of Rep. Crowley) ("Tonight we consider
another measure, this one to enable the President, our Commander in Chief, to
use what ever means required to bring this crime to justice.").
179. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 27 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
180. Response to Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note
26, at 7-8.
181. Id. at 8 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520-21 (2004)).
182. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
183. Id.
184. Gruber, supra note 91, at 1030.
185. Cf id. ("This imputed knowledge of the 'law of war' was the only
interpretive technique the Court used to determine congressional intent. In short,
the Court held that because Congress authorized military action, it must have
assumed that action could be as broad in scope as permitted by customs and
laws of war, including the exercise of military detention.").
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In support of its position that the AUMF incorporates the laws
of war, the Government also argued that "generally, statutes should
be construed, if possible, as consistent with international law."l 86
This argument refers to what has become known as the Charming
Betsy canon of statutory interpretation. This canon should not be
used to interpret the AUMF for multiple reasons.
Advocates of the canon generally argue that it gains support
from the early Supreme Court decision of Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy,1s where Chief Justice Marshall famously held
that "[a]n act of Congress ought never be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains."
Though the canon has become an important part of the U.S.
interpretive tradition,189 the validity of the canon is a matter of
controversy. 90
There are at least four different versions of the canon. The first
tracks the language of Charming Betsy and holds that domestic
statutes should never be interpreted to violate international law if
any other possible construction remains. 9 The second version of
the canon is expressed in the Restatement (Second): "If a domestic
law of the United States may be interpreted either in a manner
consistent with international law or in a manner that is in conflict
with international law, a court in the United States will interpret it
in a manner that is consistent with international law."' 9 The
Restatement (Third) has a different formulation: "Where fairly
possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to
conflict with international law or with an international agreement
of the United States."' 93 The fourth version dictates that the canon
should not apply to governmental actors, because its purpose is to
assure that only the political branches may decide to violate
186. Response to Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note
21, at 7.
187. John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law be a Part of
Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1175, 1192 (2007).
188. 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
189. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J.
479, 482 (1998) ("[T]his canon of construction has become an important
component of the legal regime defining the U.S. relationship with international
law.").
190. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 187, at 1193.
19 1. Id.
192. Bradley, supra note 189, at 490 (quoting the Second Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States).
193. Id. at 490-91 (quoting the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States).
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international law. 194 The Government perhaps advocates a fifth
interpretation according to which statutes should "general" be
construed "if possible" as consistent with international law.19
These inconsistent phrasings demonstrate a lack of agreement
as to how ambiguous a statute must be before the Charming Betsy
canon may be used as an interpretative aid.196 Thus, the canon's
availability as a viable method of interpretation is intimately tied to
which formulation the interpreter adopts.
When applied to the AUMF, the first version favors
interpreting the statute as consistent with international law,
because this interpretation is one of many "possible constructions."
In contrast, interpreting the AUMF using the canon as formulated
in the Restatement (Third) yields a different result. Construing
domestic law as consistent with international law "where fairly
possible" is a much narrower standard than doing so "if any other
possible construction remains." Given that Congress intended to
emphasize the breadth of its authorization in the AUMF through
the phrase "necessary and appropriate," and that the ratification
history of the AUMF tends to support this interpretation, it may not
be "fairly possible" to construe the AUMF consistently with
international law.
In sum, there are many interpretations of the Charming Betsy
canon. Whether the canon may be properly invoked depends on
which interpretation is employed. Such uncertainty suggests that
courts should be cautious in relying on the canon to interpret
domestic legislation.
A second argument that militates against using the Charming
Betsy canon to interpret the AUMF focuses on the status of the
international law being invoked vis-i-vis domestic law. In order to
justify killing al-Awlaki, the Obama Administration needs to argue
that the AUMF must be interpreted consistently with the laws of
war, particularly Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Convention 111.197 As
demonstrated above, this Article is non-self-executing.198 With
respect to non-self-executing treaties, there is a strong presumption
that the United States did not intend to incorporate such treaties into
194. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 187, at 1193.
195. See Response to Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra
note 21, at 7.
196. Cf Bradley, supra note 189, at 491 ("If these different phrasings reflect
a substantive difference, it may concern the degree of clarity required in a statute
before a court will conclude that the statute violates international law.").
197. See discussion supra Part II.
198. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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domestic law. 199 This presumption finds support in the Senate's
ratification of the Geneva Conventions and in the fact that no
separate statute has incorporated Article 4.200 Therefore, "[t. . .
makes sense to conclude that Congress would not want courts to
smuggle [non-incorporated international law norms] into domestic
U.S. law through the back door bp using them as a basis to alter. . .
interpretation of a federal statute." o1
Another reason why the Charming Betsy canon should not be
used to interpret the AUMF is that the canon is most often invoked
as a justification for limiting extraterritorial application of
domestic law in ways that may violate international law norms of
prescriptive jurisdiction.202 It is debatable whether the canon
should apply in the very different context of a congressional
authorization of force, especially considering that the authorization
overlaps with the President's independent constitutional powers.203
C. The Showdown: Foreign-murder Statute v. AUMF
The C.I.A.'s use of lethal force against a U.S. citizen is likely
barred by the foreign-murder statute.204  Despite the
Administration's assertions to the contrary, this extrajudicial
killing cannot be justified by invoking the laws of war, because the
relevant provisions are not domestic law. 205  Thus, the
Administration must rely on the AUMF, which results in a
showdown between the AUMF and the foreign-murder statute.
Both the legislative history of the AUMF and the long-recognized
ban against implicitly repealing legislation weigh against
199. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
200. Id. at 32-33. A common conception of the Charming Betsy canon is that
"[iut facilitates the implementation of Congressional intent." Bradley, supra note
184, at 495.
201. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 33 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
202. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 165, at 2097-98.
203. Id.; see also Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 38 ("The Charming Betsy canon
may not be invoked against the Executive to limit the scope of a congressional
authorization of war-that is, to limit a war-authorizing statute to make it
conform with non-self-executing treaties and customary international law. The
Supreme Court has never held that the Charming Betsy canon applies to a statute
that authorizes the President to use military force against a foreign enemy.")
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Cf Auth. of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation to
Override Int'l Law in Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities, 13 Op.
O.L.C. 163, 172 (1989) (arguing that the Charming Betsy cannon does not apply
to "broad authorizing statutes 'carrying into execution' core executive powers")
(quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.).
204. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
205. See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
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interpreting the AUMF as authorizing a violation of the foreign-
murder statute.
In Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court held that Congress
did not intend to repeal the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act when
it passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.206 The
Court's analysis is instructive in examining whether the AUMF
repealed the foreign-murder statute.
In Mancari, the Court noted the "cardinal rule ... that repeals
by implication are not favored," 2 07 and that "[i]n the absence of
some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only
permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the
earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable. 208 And further, "[w]here
there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be
controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority
of enactment." 20 9
Applying these principles to the statutes at issue begins with a
search for an "affirmative showing" in the AUMF that Congress
intended to repeal the foreign-murder statute. 2 10 There is certainly
no such showing in the text of the AUMF. 2 11 The AUMF's
ratification history is also devoid of any such "affirmative
showing." 2 12 To the contrary, there is an abundance of evidence
indicating that Congress intended for the President to act in
accordance with the Constitution and existing federal statutes such
as the foreign-murder statute. 213
206. 417 U.S. 535, 547 (1974).
207. Id. at 549 (quoting Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503
(1936)).
208. Id. at 550; see also State of Ga. v. Pa. R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57
(1945) ("[Rjepeals by implication are not favored. Only a clear repugnancy
between the old law and the new results in the former giving way and then only
pro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy.").
209. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 550-51; see also Bullova Watch Co. v. United
States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961) ("[I]t is familiar law that a specific statute
controls over a general one 'without regard to priority of enactment."'). This
canon of statutory interpretation is known by the legal maxim lex specialis
derogat lex generalis. See In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d 12, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2007).
210. See supra note 209.
211. See generally Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
212. Legislative history is a permissible source to search for Congressional
intent. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 550 (holding that the legislative history of a
statute at issue in that case did not affirmatively indicate that Congress intended
to repeal the 1934 preference).
213. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REc. 17,112 (2001) (statement of Rep. Paul) ("We
are placing tremendous trust in our President to pursue our enemies as our
commander-in-chief but Congress must remain vigilant as to not allow our civil
liberties here at home to be eroded."); id at 17,148 (statement of Rep. Jackson)
("I'm not willing to give President Bush carte blanche authority to fight
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Even if it could be argued that the AUMF's legislative history
is ambiguous, the AUMF would still not impliedly repeal the
foreign-murder statute unless the two statutes were
"irreconcilable." 214 That is hardly the case here. The two statutes
can "readily coexist" by construing the AUMF so as not to
authorize the President to give orders that violate the foreign-
murder statute. 2 15
Yet another argument against implicit repeal concerns the
nature of the two statutes. The foreign-murder statute is a specific
statute while the AUMF is more broad.216 When there is no clear
intention otherwise, a specific statute will not supersede a general
statute.217 As explained above, there is no indication that Congress
intended for the AUMF to control or nullify the foreign-murder
statute.218 Therefore, because the foreign-murder statute is a
specific statute and the AUMF is a broader statute, the latter should
not be construed as repealing the former.
CONCLUSION
The central issue addressed in this Comment is whether the
Obama Administration may invoke the laws of war, in particular
the laws regarding legal combatants, to justify a violation of the
foreign-murder statute. The preceding analysis suggests several
reasons that militate against such a justification.
The Supreme Court in Medellin has established that treaties are
presumptively non-self-executing. Because Article 4 of the 1949
Geneva Convention III is devoid of affirmative evidence that the
U.S. intended it to have immediate effect as domestic law, Article
terrorism. We need to agree to fight it together within traditional constitutional
boundaries."); id at 17,121 (statement of Rep. Bentsen) ("Passage of this bill
tonight will signal to these ruthless forces that the United States is fully
committed and has done so without compromising our Constitution, laws or
ideals."); id. at 17,150 (statement of Rep. McGovern) ("I want those responsible
for these heinous crimes to be hunted down and held accountable-in full
compliance with our Constitution and our laws.").
214. See supra note 209.
215. In Mancari, The Court emphasized that the statutes at issue in the case
were reconcilable because they could "readily coexist." 417 U.S. at 550.
216. The foreign-murder statute prohibits one U.S. citizen from killing
another U.S. citizen in a foreign jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006). The
AUMF, by contrast, authorizes force that affords the President broad discretion
as to use of military resources, choice of targets, methods of force, and timing.
See supra note 167; Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
217. See supra note 209.
218. See supra note 212.
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4 acquires domestic-law status only through its incorporation in
separate legislation. It is unlikely, however, that Article 4 has been
incorporated either in the UCMJ or the AUMF. Thus, the President
may not invoke the laws of war regarding legal combatants to
justify his actions domestically, which creates an unavoidable tug-
of-war between the AUMF and the foreign-murder statute. And
because the AUMF cannot reasonably be interpreted to repeal the
foreign-murder statute, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
any C.I.A. operative that executed President Obama's order to kill
al-Awlaki is guilty of murder under the foreign-murder statute. An
equally unavoidable conclusion is that certain high-ranking
executive officials, including the President, would share in that
criminal culpability.
The analysis in this Comment has important ramifications for
the United States and for the future of the War on Terror. Unless
the presumption against self-executing treaties is reversed, it will
become increasingly difficult for treaties to gain traction as
judicially enforceable domestic law. Thus, in acting pursuant to the
AUMF, it will be challenging for presidents to justify actions
based on certain international law when those norms do not enjoy
the same legal status as domestic laws. Furthermore, other
countries may be reticent to enter into international agreements
with the United States if treaties lack privileged status in our legal
system. These developments may serve to isolate the United States
at a time when the country needs all the assistance it can get in its
fight against international terrorism.
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